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#### 7 December 1959 170. The Resurfacin of Kaznacheyev

On or about 15 December 1959, Aleksandr Yurievich Kaznacheyev, who defected to the US on 24 June 1959, will be resurfaced. He formerly was an Information Officer at the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, Burma. Kaznacheyev broke with communism and the USSR almost entirely for ideological reasons. He is intelligent and has provided a good deal of solid factual information which will be useful for propaganda exploitation. Kaznacheyev's resurfacing has been carefully planned to provide for maximum impact and timeliness without conflicting with any of the various international conferences which are to be held in the next halfyear. It is now known outside US official circles that Kaznacheyev has been granted asylum by the US. This fact unavoidably will associate the government with anything he says or does. However, plans for his resurfacing and subsequent exploitation have been designed to minimize the impression of official US involvement and to portray his revelations as the statements of a sincere young man trying to tell the world the truth. The major themes which will be covered in his exploitation will be: the joint strategy of the USSR and Communist China to gain control of Burma and the rest of Asia; the USSR-CPR agreement that Burma is a primary sphere of interest of the CPR (this is conditioned by a tactical disagreement over violent versus peaceful parliamentary means of takeover); the major role of the Soviet official representation in Burma in clandestine intelligence operations and covert political manipulation of Burma's internal affairs; a description of the Moscow-controlled propaganda net in Asia and its use for political purposes; the growing embarrassment which Chicom actions in Asia are causing the Soviet Union; the assertion that the CPSU does not represent the views, desires or welfare of the Soviet peoples and that much of the progress which has been achieved has been in spite of the party rather than because of it; a description of the unhappiness, discontent and occasional active opposition of the younger generation in the USSR; a presentation of the view that, while the CPSU has been condemned historically for brutality, it may be criticized turrently for its failure to represent and govern its people fairly and wisely; and, lastly, a discussion of the particular Communist inspired hardships which have been endured by the Great Russians, which in some ways have been worse that those suffered by other nationalities in the USSR.

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#### 171. Felix Moumie and the UPC

The French Cameroons, a trusteeship territory of the French since World War II, will achieve independence on January 1, 1960. Immediately before and after this date there is likely to be a revolutionary uprising led by the Union des Population du Cameroon (UPC), whose current leader is Felix Moumie. The UPC was organized in 1947 as a party whose aims were to achieve independence for the French Cameroons and unification with the British Cameroons. The party, banned in 1955 allegedly because of its paramilitary nature, undertook to disrupt the elections to the Territorial Assembly in December 1956. The paramilitary campaign continued until September 1958 when the UPC's leader, Um Nyobe, was killed. Felix Moumie, the claimant to Um Nyobe's mantle, left the country in 1955 when the battles with the French were beginning. He now lives in Guinea though he recently returned from a visit to Peking. Following Um Nyobet death those members of the UPC involved in the actual fighting took advantage of the French amnesty offer, left the UPC, and began to take part in the legal political life of the community. The Moumie faction in exile has continued to oppose the existing moderate government, favoring new elections under UN . auspices before independence. The UN has voted against such elections and instead has urged that elections be held not too long after independence is achieved. Moumie probably feels that he must gain power within the near future, since once independence is granted the exiled UPC's role as a revolutionary party becomes increasingly anomalous. Moumie may be a Communist; there is, however, no confirmed evidence that the UPC is a Communist-controlled organization. There is no doubt that the bloc has provided funds, weapons, and continuing Soviet diplomatic support, both in the UN, and in the French Parliament through the French Communist Party.

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## 172. Indian Communist's Defection

Early in November, Dhani Ram, one of the 8 Communist members of the 80-man New Delhi Municipal Assembly, defected from the Communist Party of India (CPI). He is among the leaders of India's lowest caste, the Harijans. These are India's Untouchables, upon whom the CPI is probably counting heavily to help win the forthcoming elections in Kerala to be held about the end of January or beginning of February 1960. Dhani Ram, who has now formally declared his allegiance to the ruling Congress Party, began to question some of the policies of the CPI and the sincerity of their proclaimed concern for the Harijans. He said: "The Communists have no program for the betterment of our lot. I came to feel that they were simply using me and other Harijan leaders to gain influence and power. " But his growing distrust of Communist motives was sharply increased by the equivocal stand the CPI took when the Chinese Communists violated the McMahon Line in India's Himalayan border. "I decided," he said, "that my country comes before my party. So I resigned." Dhani Ram says that the CPI gets direct guidance from both the Soviet and Chinese Embassies. Initial indoctrination of the party's membership, Dhani Ram has pointed out, is partly through wide distribution of the Communist press (including the tabloid weekly Blitz in Bombay) which belabors Western "imperialists" but extolls the virtues of the Communist bloc. Massive propaganda, as well as funds, for the CPI come from the vast quantities of books and periodicals flowing into India from the Communist bloc, sales of which are handled through the Feople's Fublishing House, run by the CPI. "I doubt the success of the CPI's efforts to spread out in the country, "Dhani Ram said. "Its ways of thinking and its ideals are foreign to India. There is a growing belief that it is directed from abroad." There are about 50,000 Harijans in Outer Delhi, as well as large numbers almost everywhere in India. Those in Delhi, like almost all Harijans, live in hovels which have sprung up in the old city, in the shadow of the residences of caste Hindus, carrying out for a few pennies a day the most menial tasks.

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
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173. Development in Laos

The report of the UN Sub-Committee on Laos was submitted 4 November to the Secretary General of the UN. The Committee reports that forty of fortyone witnesses interviewed stated that hostile indigenous elements received support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) consisting of equipment, arms, ammunition, supplies and help of political cadres. Witnesses also indicate attacks against Lao posts were centrally coordinated. The report concludes there is insufficient evidence to prove crossings of the frontier by regular DRV troops. The SYG has indicated privately he favors mediation of the situation directly between the Lao and DRV Governments and that the presence of a "neutral representative" in Laos would serve to bring this about. The SYG has indicated that some form of UN presence should be maintained in Laos and that this may be accomplished by the assignment of UN economic representatives to Laos. SYG hopes to accomplish this through the power of his own position rather than submit the question of a UN presence to the Security Council or the General Assembly. Unconfirmed rumors, growing out of these reported views of the SYG, resulted in press reports that Laos was planning to withdraw its complaint to the UN against the DRV and that such action complied with the urgings of India and the SYG in an effort to ease relations between Laos, the DRV, and Communist China. Lao officials have not verified this rumor and have denied any such intention. A concurrent development concerns the detention and proposed treason trials of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) leaders in Vientiane. The SYG is known to favor an indefinite postponement of the trial primarily because holding the trial would contribute to an already explosive situation in Laos.



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## 174. Democratic Socialism and Marx

Since German prosperity offers no immediate hope for a change in the Socialist Party's political fortunes, it has voted a revision of its program by an overwhelming 324-16, whereby many of the doctrines of pure socialism have been discarded. The new program, the first major revision in German Socialist doctrine in 34 years, rejects many of the basic Marxist tenets. In the field of economic policy, the class struggle and State ownership of the means of production were repudiated by the SPD which declared that both lead to a concentration of economic power which endangers the socialist aims of justice. and individual freedom. The new program maintains that the consumer's freedom of choice and the worker's freedom to choose his job are "fundamentals of a socialist economic policy. " The socialists now accept the role of private enterprise and free competition as "important features" of economic policy, defining the relative extent of the private and public sector by the phrase "as much competition as possible and as much governmental regulation and planning as necessary." However, public ownership of key industries is described as the last of several possible means of control. On the basis of these considerations, communism, as it exists today, was denounced as a betrayal of the socialist idea. Traditional internationalism is replaced by the recognition that national defense and participation therein is a duty of every citizen. The traditional anti-clerical attitude is replaced by a willingness to cooperate with religions for the common good - "Socialism is not a substitute for religion,"

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# 175. Communist Plans to Disrupt OAS Conference

In February of 1960 the 11th Inter-American Conference of the Organization of American States (CAS) will be held in Quito, Ecuador. International communism has among its major goals the destruction of this organization, and the concurrent shattering of Latin American unity. Communist parties and front groups throughout Latin America already are busy with preparations for a major effort to disrupt the conference and discredit the CAS as a tool of US imperialism. Meetings to whip up anti-OAS spirit have been held outside Ecuador by Communist-influenced youth, labor and women's groups. Other such gatherings undoubtedly are planned. During the conference itself, the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) will spearhead the actual agitation, supported by Communist propaganda barrages and group actions elsewhere in Latin America. If it is to cause serious trouble during the talks, the PCE will have to gain the cooperation of the adherents of other parties. Ecudaor's five major parties are jockeying for position in the June, 1960, presidential elections. One of the few clear-cut issues with which the opposition parties can rally popular support is the Peru-Ecuador boundary dispute, which most Ecuadorans would like to have discussed at the February conference. The opposition parties realize that the talks provide them with a unique opportunity to gain votes and consequently have joined the PCE in demanding that the OAS reconsider the issue. Strong popular feeling over the border, coupled with a general restiveness over growing unemployment and the slackening rate of economic development, have given rise to a situation in which severe rioting is an ever present possibility. The PCE undoubtedly will try to capitalize on these conditions to send mobs into the streets. Ecuadoran police may enhance the impact of the demonstrations by taking harsh repressive measures against the rioters. One major restraining influence which might act on politically conscious Ecuadorans is their pride in having their country selected as the site of the meeting. Many responsible leaders probably would oppose violent disruption of the talks, if they felt that Ecuadoran prestige among other Latin nations would be damaged.

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#### 176. Peaceful Coexistence

Since his emergence in 1955, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has identified himself with and sought to gain acceptance for a program known as "peaceful coexistence", which he defines as the economic, political and ideological - but not military - struggle between the "socialist" and capitalist systems. Khrushchev's program appears to have three major objectives: to regenerate and advance the cause of international communism; to anesthetize and promote antagonism among the Western countries so that they will no longer constitute an effective barrier to Communist expansion or be capable of advancing a positive program of their own; to accelerate the ideological expansion of communism in the developing nations of Asia, Africa and South America. The tactics of "peaceful coexistence" include flanking, encircling and isolating measures wherein more subtle and diversified political and ideological weapons replace the total assault of the Stalinist era. Domestically, while making certain economic concessions and ideological adjustments, the leadership seeks to control and strictly circumscribe the limits to which this relaxation may attain. Some of the major consequences of these tactics include: reduction of repressive police controls; concessions to the consumer; modification of the internal and external propaganda line (including the partial allaying of the spectre of "imperialist aggression"); increase in economic, cultural and scientific exchanges with non-Communist countries; improvement of relations with Western and "neutral" countries; public disavowal of control over the free world. Communist parties; refinement of the technique involved in infiltration and subversion in general. Above all, the program decreases the possibility of imminent armed conflict. Regardless of Khrushchev's motives, a policy which entails such consequences is certain to have far-reaching repercussions upon both the Communist countries and upon the free world. It is significant that in pursuit of his strategic objectives, Khrushchev has been willing to accept the risk involved in allowing even a modicum of relaxation and decentralization of authority in the Soviet Union and satellites. It will be recalled that Khrushchev's initial attempt at rejuvenating communism by granting more independence to the satellite countries resulted in promoting strong revisionist and nationalist tendencies (witness Poland and Hungary) and led not so much to a revival of pristine enthusiasm as to a disenchantment with communism in general. Moreover, it demonstrated the difficulty of keeping such tendencies from spreading throughout the Communist world. Similarly, within the USSR itself, a relaxation of the mass terror of Stalin's day and concessions to the intellectuals generated a potentially explosive reaction. In China, Mao's "Hundred flowers program" produced consequences equally unfortunate for the Communist regime. Today there are indications that other leaders in the bloc as well as in the CPSU itself are not so sanguine as Khrushchev in evaluating the consequences of "peaceful coexistence" specifically:

a. Hungarian Communist Party officials are reported to believe that the Americans will be the gainers from a detente

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and will increase their pressures on weaker members of the Soviet camp.

- b. A leading Italian Communist reportedly argued at a party meeting that Khrushchev's policies were all very well for the CPSU which had been in power for forty-two years but acceptance of the principles of internal detente in countries where Communists are not in power would be an egregious error.
- c. Certain veteran CPSU members are reportedly concerned that the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange can only be expected, by destroying the symbol of anti-communism previously represented by America, to intensify the younger generation's growing ideological indifference and its cynical rejection of party doctrine.
- d. Upon learning of the exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, a high-ranking Bulgarian official was reported (reliably) to have commented: "The Americans must have an agent in the Kremlin." This is believed to typify the reaction of the inveterately Stalinist Eulgarian Party to Khrushchev and his "peaceful coexistence".

Despite its failure to gain the universal support of the Communist camp, Khrushchev's program is likely to prevail for the immediate future. Moreover, once implemented, such a course could be reversed only with considerable difficulty. At the same time, the "peaceful coexistence" program includes several points which, if energetically and purposefully exploited, could serve to further our own national policy objective of promoting evolution within the Communist countries. Such things as concessions to the Soviet consumer, increased East-West contacts, modification of virulent Communist propaganda, a diminution of jamming, etc. could ultimately work to the advantage of the free world. For example, once the Soviet citizen ceases to be haunted by fears of Western aggression, he may take it upon himself to press his government to devote a greater share of the national wealth to consumer products. In the field of international trade, it may be possible to export some traditionally "capitalist" ideas such as freedom and representative government along with helicopters and corn. Nor is the West displeased with a certain demoralization and fragmentation of many of the Communist parties in the free world, which has been a significant - if transitory consequence of Khrushchev's new course. At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge the potentially grave consequences to the West of a policy which by professing to proscribe war and to coexist peacefully with everyone, increases the natural proclivities of our

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society to devote its energies and resources to internal development. "Peaceful coexistence" can be advantageous to the West only in so far as we recognize the challenge for what it is, resolutely oppose all form of Communist expansion and at the same time, energetically and purposefully advance a positive program of our own. Such a program would be addressed not only to restraining communism and supporting our friends, but to the basic problem of finding a way to ensure the peaceful and democratic evolution of the developing countries. In Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactic, the free world has an opportunity to encourage a trend within the Soviet Union which could cause the messianic zeal of the Communist movement to be re-oriented and ultimately consumed in internal development. At the same time, by refurbishing its own ideological armory it can successfully meet Khrushchev's challenge in the struggle for the developing nations of Asia and Africa.

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# **CORRECTION:**

Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 27, 23 November 1959

Item #164: Crisis in Indonesian and Chinese Communist Relations

Change 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1960.

Omit Berne before Neue Zuricher Zeitung